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SPACE APPLICATIONS - ANOTHER WINGMAN 
Introduction
"The quality and quantity of information 
comprehended per unit of time may now determine 
who wins or loses a sales order or a war."
Tom Peters
We justifiably pride ourselves as a nation on our military 
capabilities, especially since our recent success in Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm. However, it is very possible that in the mid-90 f s the Federal 
Express truck driver will have better situation awareness and global 
connectivity than a fighter pilot.
As not only the Air Force, but the other military services look into 
the future, it is clear that we will all have to take the maximum advantage 
of both our newer technologies as well as existing capabilities to leverage 
costs and systems which can contribute to improved military performance 
on the battlefield.
This paper suggests some ways in which Air Force Space Command, 
working with other Air Force major commands, will increase the war 
fighter's comfort level with .-- and ability to employ -- space systems. 
Space systems have been around for about thirty years, but their potential 
contributions to the "trigger puller" at the unit level are just beginning to 
be investigated and exploited by the operator. A reasonable comparison of 
how the Air Force air breathing flying community and the space flying 
community have done business in the past might be the left and right 
hemispheres of the brain, both "doing their own thing" with very little 
connecting tissue (corpus colossum) tying them together.
In order to convey the potential of space to support combat flight 
operations, it might be helpful to think of space systems as another 
"wingman" in the flight. A good supporting wingman provides mutual 
support, contributes to better situation awareness, and adds to the 
firepower potential of the flight. Space systems appear to have the ability 
to perform well as a "supporting wingman." Information output, force 
structure size and diversity, and predictability are real pluses for space 
system wingman support. In addition, connectivity can be enhanced
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throughout all levels of command, from the flight lead to the Joint Force 
Commander.
The clear vision of Air Force senior leaders is to effectively integrate 
space capabilities into global reach, global power objectives. Air Force 
Space Command established an office in August, 1990, manned with a 
cross-section of highly experienced aircrews from all the major commands 
who are experts in the major weapons systems, along with engineers and 
space specialists. The Space Applications Division charter is to work 
closely with operational flying commands as well as with the various space 
communities to investigate, assess, and demonstrate the capabilities of 
space systems and their potential to support the operational missions of 
the Air Force. Since all Services have flying assets, the experiments 
conducted by the Air Force could be applied to other Services' flying 
programs as well.
Desert Shield/Desert Storm provided the first operationally relevant 
benchmark for space support to large-scale military operations over a 
sustained period. It never quite achieved "wingman" status for the 
operator, despite Herculean attempts by all who provided support to the 
war. Much of what was accomplished evolved over a period of some 
months before becoming operationally usable. Within the Air Force, a 
great deal of potential could not be converted to operational utility, since 
we lacked sufficient end user equipment, especially at the wing 
operational level, to exploit existing capabilities. Recent testimony from 
senior military leaders regarding Desert Shield/Desert Storm support and 
outcome, shows that much remains to be done to make good on the 
potential for support to the war fighter. The results of Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm provided an excellent stimulus to find ways of doing 
the job better, from both flight operations and space applications 
perspectives. A place to start would be to improve the awareness of both 
communities about each others' capabilities, limitations, and requirements.
The emphasis should be focused to provide tactical information 
including weather, communications, navigation, and inputs to improved 
situation awareness and targeting data at the unit level, preferably in the 
cockpit. By approaching the problem from a bottom-up perspective, it 
might be possible to adequately address not only the aircrew needs, but in 
the process satisfy the wing, air component, and possibly theater level 
requirements as well. The traditional top-down approach has done 
reasonably well at the highest levels of military command, but has not 
necessarily met the requirements of the trigger puller, especially regarding
1-15
issues of timeliness and accuracy of information at the tactical level of 
operations.
Even recent Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) recommendations 
reinforce the idea that we should concentrate on the unit level   that is, at
brigade and wing operational levels   and that space capabilities should 
therefore be investigated from the point of view that their capabilities, 
when, properly exploited, comprise another tactically supportive wingman.
Wingman Potential
Today, space systems are information systems. The two general 
kinds of information of great worth to a war fighter are those which 
contribute to situation awareness and to achieving a targeting solution for 
weapons delivery.
1. Situation Awareness. There are many different definitions of 
this concept, and here's another one which will help frame the following 
discussions about making space real to the operator. (As can be seen, by 
substituting different words, the definition could also be applied to the 
business world as well). Situation awareness is knowledge of the mission (product), environment (business climate), threat (competitors), and target (customer) along with knowledge about changes in the above factors in 
time to make a difference, and to use that knowledge to retain the 
strategic/tactical advantages of the plan.
2. Targeting Quality Information. Information of sufficiently 
fine granularity to successfully plan and execute the strategy. Includes 
accurate pre-conflict deliberate planning with prioritized information 
exchange requirements suitable for immediate implementation upon 
execution; pre-mission planning information just prior to mission 
execution; penetration/enroute information; and, finally, detqjled 
information about the target and surrounding area.
One of the most important capabilities of a wingman is to be in the 
briefed position, when and where required. Kepler dictates the availability 
of space systems, and therefore they can be used to rendezvous with a 
large air package, just like other aircraft coming from widely separated 
bases do. By planning Time Over Target (TOT) and other timing factors to 
take advantage of space system availability, the strike force commander 
can improve his overall ability to successfully carry out his plan of attack. 
However, this requires that the planners responsible for generating the Air
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Tasking Order (ATO) be aware of the availability times of various space 
systems.
Communications connectivity is another very important wingman 
requirement, and is the key to successfully integrating space systems into 
the cockpit. This allows the "wingman" to impart knowledge of the tactical 
situation, provide warning of threats not generated by the leader's on- 
board sensors, and pass information from other support units which will 
contribute to successful mission accomplishment. There is a valid concern 
that task saturation can occur with too much information coming into the 
cockpit. By bringing in the operators early on, and experimenting in 
realistic tactical situations with the types and amounts of information per 
unit time we prevent the "fire hose" effect. By allowing receiver filtering 
of information, the pilot can plan his mission, set filters before takeoff, and 
then get what he wants, when he wants it during his mission profile. The 
man-machine interface factors for helping determine the acceptability of 
information have been progressing very well ever since the F-15 re- 
introduced the single-seat fighter concept to the Air Force. The real 
challenge is to integrate space-derived information in an easily digestible 
way which complements information from on-board sensors and other 
familiar information sources.
Space and the New Weapon Systems
A natural affinity exists between air power and space power. The 
kinds of information and update rates, coupled with predictability, global 
coverage, and communications connectivity make space systems very 
attractive to the operator as he looks for improvements in his employment 
capabilities. These capabilities exist today, and must be examined for their 
value added and operational utility at all levels of command. Draft Air 
Force Program Guidance for this year states the following:
"As the department of Defense focuses on what each 
service does best, the unique characteristics of 
airpower -- speed, stealth, range/reach, flexibility, 
precision, and lethality   will be at a premium."
"...Investment priorities will focus on capabilities or 
platforms representing core combat capabilities of our 
aerospace force into the next century. We should 
increase efforts to evaluate our investment programs, 
implement lower cost acquisition strategies, and
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ensure greater program stability to maximize combat 
capability."
The new weapons and weapon delivery systems under development 
today are becoming larger and larger consumers of higher and higher 
quality information delivered in less and less time. Statements of Need (SONs) and other formal documentation already on the books for numerous 
systems just being fielded, clearly show a need for support from off-board 
systems. In order to make good on the promise of ideas like adverse 
weather, autonomous, stand-off precision weapons, excellent connectivity 
between the sensor and the shooter needs to exist. The connectivity must 
be available during pre-mission planning, enroute to the target, and at the 
weapon delivery point.
In the past,, technology constraints, security policy, and timeline 
requirements for top-level (National Command Authorities and theater 
commanders) assessments and planning dictated an "operational tempo" 
that was not driven by rapidly evolving tactical changes on the battlefield. 
Requirements for some space system tasking, collection, and information 
dissemination were sized to support strategic, deliberate technical analysis. 
Support timelines were measured in days, and performed well for the 
activities that were supported at a time when the principal emphasis was 
on the ability to respond effectively at the strategic level of conflict.
The Changing Environment
The current world economic and military environment is extremely 
dynamic. It remains to be seen whether the Russian Republics will stay 
the course with their experiments in greater freedom, with the 
accompanying wrenching changes in their culture, society, economy, and 
military. While strategic capabilities must be retained at a reasonable 
level vis a vis nuclear capabilities, we need to address the potential 
contribution of space systems to theater tactical, and low-intensity conflict 
as well.
U.S. forces are becoming smaller, lighter, and more expeditionary, 
based in CONUS and rapidly deploying worldwide to respond to crisis 
situations. Due to the increasing sophistication of possible adversaries, 
these lighter forces must be able to bring firepower to bear in a decisive, 
efficient way. Lift assets must provide smaller, more capable support 
packages which can be easily set up, transported, and used in adverse 
weather environments.
1-18
The SASC recently addressed this concern with this observation:
"A variety of ongoing DOD programs provide terminals 
to tactical forces to receive, process, and display 
critical...data. The committee is concerned, however, 
that these systems are not being deployed widely 
enough or are too large to deploy easily in 
contingencies...."
End user terminals which require huge lift budgets for mobility will 
not compete favorably with beans and bullets when we try to deploy 
rapidly to a contingency. Additionally, these large processing units require 
large numbers of support personnel. Besides eating lift, these personnel 
increase the signature of deployed forces, and provide additional targets of 
opportunity for hostile action. A better situation would be to develop 
systems which can fit into the mobility kits of the war fighting units, leave 
labor intensive functions in CONUS, and use global connectivity devices to 
pass information to a smaller, lighter, less vulnerable deployed force.
A good example of how Air Force Space Command and Air Force 
Systems Command were able to solve the problem of large size quickly 
during Desert Shield/Desert Storm involves the Mark IV van which 
receives and processes the downlink from the Defense Meteorological 
Satellite Program (DMSP). Through a program called "High Gear," Systems 
Command was able to retain the capabilities of the Mark IV van but shrink 
them from a C-130 load into a suite of equipment that, even with its 
packing cases, fits nicely in the back of a HUMMV. We need to do more 
along these lines with all end user terminals which receive/process space- 
derived information.
The trend in military operations worldwide is toward a technically 
more capable threat able to mask its intentions better, resulting in highly 
compressed decision, and response times, both in the cockpit and at 
command levels.
Recalling the Air Force Draft Program Guidance, we need to examine 
all available capabilities to improve our ability to operate at high closure 
rates and over large geographic areas that characterize air operations. Our 
C4I systems have to match the speed and area coverage potential of the air 
domain; that is, speeds from 200 - 800 knots and combat radius of about 
1000 nautical miles (nm).
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Our current airbreathing Service-organic sensors (E-3A, J-STARS, 
Rivet Joint, etc.) are limited to about 300nm line-of-sight. On the night of 
16 Jan 91, the distance travelled by F-117s, F-15s, and other aircraft from 
the Saudi political border to Baghdad was approximately 600nm. The 
question is: who was watching the store and providing support to the 
aircrews for the last 300nm to the target?
How to Get There from Here
We need to expand the ability of space systems from the traditional 
C4I/mission planning functions into the mission execution functions. Space 
systems can indeed provide global situation awareness for the war fighters 
when they have penetrated beyond organic service sensors. To achieve a 
higher degree of operational utility involves reducing timelines for sensor 
tasking, collection and information dissemination.
Ongoing efforts to streamline and speed up information collection, 
analysis and dissemination will emphasize use of expert system processing 
for those functions which need them. It leads both the space and 
operational communities to a detailed discussion and examination of the . 
utility of space systems with on-board processing capabilities and direct 
downlinks as well as centralized processing. In addition, war fighters need 
to evaluate additional alternatives such as satellite direct downlink to 
theater processors like those developed by the Army Space Program Office 
for support to the Corps Commander.
Where timelines can be reduced by eliminating intermediate 
handlers and middlemen, we can improve information flow to the trigger 
puller all the way up the chain to the theater commander. The objective is 
to improve all space systems' ability to process and provide the most 
timely data to all levels of command. That way operators can access 
information required to execute the ATO, the air component commander 
can access information to build the ATO, and the theater commander can 
access information to enhance the theater operational level of planning. 
This must be done in a way that still allows information access to other 
users as well. Detailed analysis, data base development and the other 
laborious tasks which form the baseline by which we can effectively 
employ military force must be equally well served in the future.
We must examine ways in which our existing space capabilities can 
be leveraged to provide cost savings in avionics development and design
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for new aircraft and weapons systems (off-board complements to on-board 
sensors). At approximately $2000 per pound, any savings realized on 
avionics, when multiplied by large procurement numbers, can add up to 
significant cost savings.
Experiment with new ideas and capabilities. Few, if any, in either 
the space community as a whole or in the operational war fighting 
community can state conclusively what the bounds of the possible are with 
respect to operational utility and value added of space in the cockpit. We 
can establish the envelope by investing very small resources in user- 
oriented demonstrations and experiments which put space capabilities in 
the hands of the operator, allow him to exercise and train with them, 
assess these capabilities with simulation and analytical tools, and ensure 
that both the space and the operator communities become more aware of 
each other.
With the objective of making space real for the operator, HQ 
AFSPACECOM established the Space Applications Division in August, 1990. 
Manned by experts from all the major Air Force commands and their 
weapons systems as well as with engineers and space personnel, the office 
is chartered to work with both the aircrews and with the space 
communities. Since the office's beginning coincided with Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm, interest in how space systems performed in the war 
has been integral to the office's efforts. Part of the office's charter is to be 
the Air Force executive agent for a Congressionally mandated program 
known as Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP).
TENCAP is an activity that all Services pursue with varying levels of 
success and funding. Both war fighters and Congress noted the impressive 
leveraging capabilities of TENCAP where the military was able to generate 
additional value added from the nation's investment in high-cost space 
systems. By developing simple, low-cost user terminals, improving 
communications connectivity, and educating operational users on the 
capabilities inherent in the systems, the TENCAP organizations were able to 
contribute some of the most valuable information systems in the Gulf.
While the capabilities by our nation's space systems are impressive, 
they are not unique from a support standpoint. They fit well-established 
concepts developed over the history or air warfare. Doctrinally and 
procedurally, these capabilities should fit into existing roles and missions 
of the Air Force as articulated in AFM 1-1, MCM 3-1, and in theater 
Operations Plans (OPlans).
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In particular, operational planning has not addressed the capabilities 
of space to support the commander or his subordinates. There is a specific 
space support annex. (Annex N) identified for providing required 
information on space capabilities in support of the plan. Generally, the 
Annex N is very skimpy on detail, or non-existent. Recently, the Air 
Component Command of US Forces Korea was the first Air Force 
organization to develop a detailed space support annex to OPlan 5027. By 
developing the plan, the command was able to improve its knowledge 
about space systems as well as identify operational shortfalls. Those 
shortfalls can be used to initiate formal requirements to improve various 
combat functions by adding space-derived capabilities to in-theater 
capabilities. Additionally, this gives the theater a good baseline from 
which to exercise space systems in support of the OPlan, thereby giving the 
operators greater insight into the support available from overhead.
Of equal importance to the planning process is the need to get 
hardware and prototype systems into the hands of the operator. There are 
several ongoing projects designed to explore and investigate integrating 
off-board sensor information into the cockpit, to examine more efficient 
ways to provide warning data on tactical ballistic missile launches, to bring 
space capabilities into the new Theater Battle Management initiative 
chaired by Air Combat Command. Also, a simulation facility is being 
developed to assess the value added of space systems to theater level war 
fighting, and education efforts are ongoing throughout the USAF.
Space Applications Division Projects
The first priority of the office is to get space hardware and 
capabilities in the hands of the operators, preferably in the cockpit. To 
that end, we have begun a project known as Talon Sword which takes 
advantage of the ongoing interest in Real Time Information to the Cockpit 
(RTIC) by the tactical air forces. Talon Sword builds on the "Fastball" F-16 
work done by Air Warfare Center in trying to fuse various information 
inputs and then pass them into the cockpit and display them in a timely 
fashion to the pilot. This study will focus on tactically useful information 
which will be assessed principally in terms of its utility in improving 
situation awareness. The Navy will participate with an EA-6B equipped 
with a Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) suite aboard. However, an adjunct 
to the demonstration will be to explore the ability to provide targeting 
quality information to a stand-off, precision weapon.
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One of the most important aspects of all demonstrations is to 
adequately provide communications connectivity to all participants. The 
office will provide suitcase-sized UHF satellite communications hardware 
along with small SHF transceivers to support exercises in the Far East, 
within CONUS, and in Europe. Successful use of SATCOM will free 
commanders from having to depend exclusively on heavy, static landline- 
specific communications architectures, and will allow a much higher level 
of mobility, flexibility, and throughput.
Once the hardware is in the hands of the operators, exercising and 
training with it is vital. The Space Applications Division works with other 
service TENCAP organizations and air components to integrate space 
capabilities efficiently into large-scale theater efforts as well as daily 
training. In Korea, exercise Cope Jade will provide an opportunity for the 
air component commander to exercise its newly developed space support 
plans. The upcoming JCS Special Project 93 will also examine the utility of 
space systems from a unified command theater standpoint. The Army is 
lead on Questor Grail, part of a continuing series of tests to improve the 
timeliness and accuracy of tactical ballistic missile warning data to air 
defense units.
The adage that "you fight like you've trained, so train like you'll 
fight" was proven once again in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Any operator 
who has been in combat knows that unless he/she has trained with a 
capability and is proficient in using it, a promised capability which only 
appears when the first bullet goes by the windscreen will not be used 
effectively. It will probably be dispensed along with the chaff and flares. 
That is why the emphasis on training and exercising with our nation's 
space systems needs to be conducted all the way down to brigade and 
wing operational levels. The good news is that many valuable capabilities 
can become available with changes to procedures, philosophies, and 
policies.
Air Force Space Command is actively participating in the Theater 
Battle Management initiative by integrating space-based capabilities into 
the emerging C4I architectures being developed to support the war fighter 
at all levels of command. The efficiencies achievable by using the global 
connectivity offered by SATCOM will contribute greatly to the stated 
objectives in the Air Force Program Guidance.
One of the areas that needs rigorous examination is the explicit 
modeling of space systems support to theater level warfare. While there
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are numerous tools at all levels of fidelity and aggregation to examine 
theater war, and a similar number of excellent space analytical tools, a 
need exists to tie the two together with specifically developed Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs) to assess the value added of space to war fighting 
from an analytical standpoint. The office has begun a modest effort to 
attempt that feat. We will not conduct comparative evaluations of the 
various space systems; that is not our charter. But we can provide an 
operationally relevant viewpoint about how space systems might 
contribute.
The Challenge: Focus the Vision
The paradigm shifts that have occurred in world affairs also greatly 
affect the military. The emerging third world countries with access to 
highly sophisticated military hardware, coupled with our current budget 
constraints, rapidly advancing technologies, and the continuous search for 
greater efficiencies dictate that all of this country's capabilities be 
examined carefully for their potential contribution to support military 
operations. The issue is not whether we should have a military, but rather 
how well we can focus military power in a timely, effective fashion when, 
where and at the level of force necessary to successfully carry out national 
policy. However, in order to make good on the promise space systems 
hold, both operational war fighters and the space community as a whole 
must re-think the way we have done business for the last thirty years. 
New national strategies directed at regional contingencies being fought 
with a CONUS-based, small, lethal expeditionary force structure will 
demand highly responsive space system support.
We must avoid becoming mesmerized by technology for technology's 
sake. Operational requirements need to drive how we spend our next 
dollar within the space community. In an austere budget environment, 
clear strategy-to-task-to-force structure methodologies must direct our 
ideas and R&D efforts. The space communities need to be attentive to the 
emerging C4I initiatives like the Navy's Copernicus and the Air Force's 
Theater Battle Management, and build new capabilities that are 
interoperable with military systems.
To summarize, there is a fantastic opportunity for the U.S. military to 
greatly improve its capability to operate effectively in a dynamic, rapidly 
changing threat environment at all levels of conflict by better use of space 
systems to support military operations. The key, for the Air Force, is to 
put these capabilities in the hands of both the aircrews and the
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commanders. As we gain in sophistication, we can anticipate cost savings 
in new avionics packages, greater accuracy and timeliness of information 
exchange, and, to return to Mr. Peters' quote, a resulting "X" in the win 
column by bringing space systems into the flight as another wingman.
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